Electronic Resource
Article - The dark side of shareholder orientation: A reflection of Rappaport’s concept of shareholder value Vol. 22, No. 2 Nomor Artikel: e2379
The concept of shareholder value has been the subject of heated debate for 40 years.
Surprisingly, the literature seems to overlook the fact that shareholder orientation by
management is something completely different from the implementation of this idea
in the well-known shareholder value concept, which aims to measure the contribu-
tion of management to shareholder welfare. Using a market-oriented framework, this
study shows that the fundamental orientation of shareholders' subjective preferences
is supported by a property rights perspective inspired by the ideas of the Austrian
School of Economics. In contrast, Alfred Rappaport's shareholder value concept is
based on neoclassical equilibrium thinking and, therefore, counteracts the real, imper-
fect environment of the corporation's decision-makers, especially their subjective
values. This results from individual preferences and decision parameters, as well as
incomplete and asymmetric information. Thus, it ignores the reality of managerial
decision-making. Based on these considerations, we argue that the advocacy of a
general managerial orientation toward shareholders' objectives does not logically
imply full support for the implementation of the idea under Rappaport's concept. In
doing so, this essay contributes to a more differentiated discussion on valuation, cor-
porate governance, and managerial decisions.
Tidak tersedia versi lain